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Abstract
It is often argued that Islam is not compatible with modernity. This can be
seen for instance in the fact of the problem that Islam faces to the challenge
of universal values of human rights. Built on this supposition, the present
article discusses on the great extent the question of religious freedom in
Islam. As freedom of religion in the framework of universal declaration
of human rights can mean as freedom to change religion, this contradicts to
Islamic prohibition of  apostasy, punishable with death penalty. The author
argues that Islam in fact guarantees religious freedom. This is clear from
the Quranic injunctions assuring the freedom of choice whether to embrace
Islam or not. Such a freedom is however often contradicted to one prophetic
tradition sanctioning death penalty for apostasy. In her view, the author
believes that the h}adi>th more in attunes to the political strategy of  the
prophet to safe Muslim community from any acts of treason or sedition.
Death penalty for apostasy is thus not related to the mere personal crime
of changing religion but more that of public law related to war or crimes
against state. More relying on the modern interpretation of  the Quranic
verses as well as the prophetic traditions, the author concludes that Islam
is in conjunction with the modern values of  religious freedom in which
personal choice of religion or belief is the backbone of human rights.
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‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion of
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.’1
A. Introduction
One of the challenges to the universality of human rights
according to Michael Ignatieff arises from the resurgence of Islam.2
Indeed, the global resurgence of Islam since the seventies has been
classified in the West under the monolithic category of  religious
fundamentalism. Following the collapse of  the communist system, the
West has viewed the phenomenon of  Islamic revitalization primarily
as a threat to its global interest. The subsequent stereotyping and
demonization of Islam have continued to gain strength so that today
Islam has become equated, in the West, with fanaticism, brutality,
intolerance, violence, terrorism, despotism, violation of human rights,
and obscurantism. The western media has only furthered these
stereotypes.
Such perspectives of Islam might have also been exacerbated
and influenced by Huntington’s thesis of  a ‘clash of  civilizations’, that
the next war will be between civilizations that is, between Islamic
civilization and Western civilization.
One of the pressing issues today as scholars rethink and challenge
narrow understanding of Islam, especially in so far as it concerns human
rights, pluralism and interreligious dialogue, is freedom of religion,
including conversion and rules of  apostasy. Since the Declaration of
human rights in 1945, the concept of freedom of religion has emerged
as an essential part of  international law. In the West, people think of
the freedom to convert from one religion to another as a central
guarantee of religious freedom. However, in Muslim milieus, a different
perspective exists, so the question of whether there should be freedom
to convert to another religion remains contested.
–––––––––––––––––
1 Article 18 and 16 of  UDHR, see twenty-four Human Right Doc, p. 8
2 See Michael Ignatieff, “The Attack on Human Rights”, Foreign Affairs,
November/December 2001, p. 102.
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It is historically significant that when the Declaration of Human
Rights issued its proclamation on religious freedom, objections were
raised by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian UN representative was
particularly outspoken in criticizing this provision on the grounds that
Islam did not permit Muslims to change their religion.3 This objection
has been the basis for much subsequent research and argument
concerning Islam and freedom of religion.
Contrary to the Saudi representative, a Pakistan representative
to the UN voiced approval of the article in question. He spoke
effectively in defense of  the proposition, saying essentially, that
freedom of religions as presented in that article was fully consonant
with Islam. But, other Muslims disagreed with his opinion. Thus, there
is still a serious point of conflict and tension within Islam over concepts
of  human rights as issued by the UN. The conservative Muslim opinion
has been supported by state bans on conversion from Islam even with
the possibility of  the death penalty for apostasy, especially in Egypt.4
Although Islam fully recognizes the rights of individuals to practice
the religion of their choice, apostasy (ridda) in traditional Muslim
societies is strictly forbidden, even carrying the punishment of death.
The right of a Muslim citizen to voluntarily renounce his or her religion
is categorically denied. Changing religion as a matter of personal choice
is prohibited and sanctions against apostasy appear to be so solidly
established in the penal law that any conceivable change in this area
seems unlikely.
Much also has been written about the relation of Islam and Islamic
culture to Western notions regarding the organization of  society and
human rights. But the point of  much of  this writing is to demonstrate
–––––––––––––––––
3 David Little, John Kelsay, and Abdulaziz Sachedina (eds.), Human Rights and
the Conflict of  Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty (Columbia:
University of  South Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 35-37.
4 Since the 1970, there have been continuing demands in Egypt for a
reinforcement of the death penalty for apostasy from Islam. Also the widely known
1994-1996 case of the Egyptian University professor Nasr H{ami>d Abu> Zayd, who had
to divorce his wife for his alleged apostasy, showed that Egypt’s court were prepared to
penaltize religious dissent in other ways. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human
Rights, Tradition and Politics, Third Edition (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p. 154.
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that Islam and the West are at the opposite poles concerning these
important issues. In other words, these scholars argue that Islam is
incompatible with the idea of  human rights. Their main argument is
that the provisions of the shari>’a are in conflict with this concept and
that these provisions continue to control the minds of  Muslims. This
view point is mainly derived from a monolithic perception of Islam,
exclusively referring to radical Islam, especially its development in the
Middle East.
Obviously, the monolithic framing of  many Western observers
which lends to misunderstand Islam is due largely to their limited
knowledge of  its nature. While it may be true that secular bias, as
Esposito believes,5 has contributed to the failure of many non-Muslim
scholars to understand Islam properly, the major pitfall lies in their
ignorance of  the fact that Islam is a polyinterpretable6 religion.
B. Theoretical Frameworks
What do I mean that Islam is polyinterpretable? Although Islam
may appear to be monolithic, its form and expression vary from one
Muslim individual to another and from group to group.  Thus, there is
no single interpretation for the Qur’an as the source of Islam. In
addition, there is no concept of “church” in Islam and no one authority
can issue a religious edict and expect it to be accepted universally by
all Muslims. So how is Islam, especially shari>‘a here to be understood?
There are a number of factors which can influence the outcome
of  an individual Muslim’s understanding of  the shari>‘a. Sociological,
cultural and intellectual circumstances, or what Arkoun describes as
the ‘aesthetics of  reception’, certainly contribute to the forms and
substances of interpretation. The ‘aesthetic of reception’ means, ‘how a
discourse, oral or written, is received by listeners or readers’, especially,
in the case of Islam and Muslims reception of the Qur’an. More
specifically, it refers to the conditions of  individual perception of  each
level of culture corresponding to a social group in every phase of
–––––––––––––––––
5 See,John L. Esposito, “Seculer Bias and Islamic Revivalism”, in The Chronicle
of Higher Education, May 1993.
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historical development.7
Each Qur’anic verse produces an appropriate meaning according
to the mode in which the interpreter understands it. According to Ibn
‘Arabi,8 each word of  the Qur’an –not to mention its verses and chapters
–has an indefinite number of meanings, all of which are intended by
God. Proper recitation of the Qur’an opens up the reader to new
meanings at every reading. “When meaning repeats itself  for someone
reciting the Qur’an, he has not recited it as it should be recited. This is
proof of his ignorance”9 And unless the text and its context are
continually being reheard in the ever new texture, one is really not
hearing what the text means. Rereading the scriptural sources
themselves with a new eye is necessary.
Thus, no single scripture trajectory of any teaching should be
absolutized and allowed to absorb the others. The evolutionary process
–––––––––––––––––
6 A lengtly socio-historical discussion on this issue is found in, among other,
Marshall. G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of  Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization,
vol. I-III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
7 See, Arkoun, “The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought”, in Klauss
Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), Islam: State and Society (London: Curzon Press,
1988), p. 58. In hermeneutics, inspired by Paul Ricoeur and Gadamer, each in his ways,
we knew that reading text is not such a straightforward event. The text will disclose its
meaning in interactive ways. Text means or produces meaning in many and different
ways. In addition insight and enlightenment are provided in various contexts and by
various peoples. Thus, everybody has his or her rights to understand the words he/she
heard or read. He/she has his/her own reflection for the texts.
8 His full name is Muh}ammad ibn ‘A<li> ibn Muh}ammad ibn al-‘Arabi> al-T|a>’i> al-
Hati>mi>, is a greatest Sufi Andalusia. He was born in Murcia, Andalusia, Spain on 17
Ramad}a>n 560 H (July 28, 1165). One of the great miracles of career of our Great Master
was his book. Osman Yahia, in the two volumes on the biography of  Ibn al-’Arabi and
the classification of his writings, accounted that Ibn al-’Arabi might have written 700
books, short articles, and collections of his poetry which 400 of them are available. The
Meccan Revelation (Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah) itself  contains 17, 000 of  pages in Yahia’s critical
edition. The most scared by scholars is reading all Meccan Revelation, without mentioning
others, either in the printed edition or manuscript. The problem has not been in the
thickness of his book, but in its content which is difficult and demanding high
understanding of Islamic knowledge. This help to understand why the Great Master
(Shaykh al-Akbar), while his influence was world wide, but has been relatively forgotten
by modern scholarships. He died in Damascus, 22 Rabi>‘ al-Tha>ni> 638 (November
1240).
9 Ibn al-‘Arabi>, Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah, vol. IV, p. 367.
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of interpretation that makes up the texts must continue today in the
same manner in which it took place then, in continuity with what went
before, preserving the past without embalming it, faithful to the past
without being limited by it. We should be critically aware of  the
historical context in which Islam grew up when interpreting the doctrine.
In other words, “faithfulness to principles cannot involve faithfulness
to the historical model, because times change, societies and political
and economic systems become more complex, and in every age it is in
fact necessary to think of a model appropriate to each social and cultural
reality.”10
Different intellectual inclinations also influence the effort to
understand the Shari‘a and thus lead to different interpretations of a
particular doctrine. Such inclinations can take the form of  recovering
the true meaning of  the doctrine as literally expressed in the text, or
finding general principles of doctrine beyond its literal or textual
expression. Thus, while accepting the general principle of the shari>‘a,
Muslims do not adhere to a single interpretation of it.
The emergence of a number of different schools of thought in
Islamic jurisprudence and various theological and philosophical streams
show that Islamic teachings are thus polyinterpretable. Throughout
history the interpretable nature of Islam has functioned as the basis of
Islamic flexibility. In addition, it also confirms the necessity of  pluralism
in Islamic tradition. Therefore, as many have argued, Islam can not
and should not be perceived as monolithic. Thus Islam, as it actually
exists and because of ‘the divergence in the social, economic and
political context’ has meant different things to different people.
One also has to take into account the sociological influences
while interpreting a divine scripture. No interpretation, however honest,
can be free of such influence. The theologians and jurists of the first
–––––––––––––––––
10 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of  Islam (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), p. 36. In addition, says Ramadan, some religious commands
related to the affairs of the world naturally take on the color of the culture of various
countries: “the principle remains the same, but the ways of being faithful to them are
diverse. So the concern should not be to dress as Prophet dressed but to dress according
to the principles (of  decency/politeness/morality/respectability, cleanness, simplicity,
aesthetics, and modesty) that underlay his choice of clothes.”
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century of Islam who acquired great prestige and whose opinions are
taken as final in Muslim traditions were themselves not free from such
influences. Their formulations and interpretations must be seen against
the sociological perspective of their time, and cannot be seen apart
from these limitations. Thus, any interpretation of  scripture bears marks
of  the ethos of  its own times.
Al-Ghaza>ly (d. 1111), known as h}ujjat al-Isla>m, asserts that sacred
texts such as Qur’an and H}adi>th are open to interpretation on five
different levels: (1) ontological-existential (dha>ti), (2) experiential (h}issi),
(3) conceptual (khayya>li), (4) intellectual (‘aqli), and (5) metaphorical
(shabahi or majazi)11. Thus, everyone who interprets a statement of  the
text in accordance with one of the above levels of analysis has deemed
such statements to be true. And anyone who engages in such
interpretation, as long as he observes the rules of  hermeneutics should
not be branded as an unbeliever.
Nevertheless, all interpretations of a sacred text are not of equal
value. Some may be misguided or even completely wrong. However,
wrong interpretations should not be suppressed as heresy. An
interpretation is heretical only if  it denies the truth of  a sacred text on
all five hermeneutical levels above. Epistemologically, the exegesis of
a sacred text constitutes informed opinion (z}ann) and not absolute
truth (h}aqq), thus no one may claim an exclusive right of  interpretation
and no single interpretation is definitive. This approach helps not only
preserve alternative voices that keep the process of  interpretation
open-ended, its spirit conforms to the liberal ideal of  freedom of  speech
by granting to jurists and theologians the right to be wrong.  The Qur’an,
after all, is God’s Speech; it is the self-disclosure of  His infinite Essence.
Diverse interpretations of the Qur’an answer to the diverse modes in
which God discloses himself  to the book’s readers. To use Ibn ‘Arabi’s
term, “The Qur’an is an ocean without shore”.12
Shari>‘a, unlike the Qur’an, is full of  human opinions. Correct
knowledge of the history of Islam also indicates that shari>‘a law
developed centuries ago, and that, due to social and political
–––––––––––––––––
11 See, Abu> H{ami>d Al-Ghaza>li>’s Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Isla>m wa’l-Zandaqa.
12 Ibn al-‘Arabi>, Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah, vol. II, p. 581.
374 Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2007 M/1428 H
Syafa’atun Almirzanah
circumstances, its stipulations have not been amended to accord with
new social conditions.  Thus we can say that the corpus of  Shari>‘a is a
human construction, and some aspects of  it may evolve just as human
thought evolves and just as some aspect of the Qur’an and the Sunna
were revealed over time. The Prophet says, “God sends to this
community, every hundred years, someone to renew its religion.” This
renewal is not a modification of  the sources but a transformation of
the mind and eyes that read them, which are indeed naturally influenced
by the new social, political, and scientific environment in which they
live. It is for this reason that there are various schools of  jurisprudence,
which differ from one another on many questions. According to Abu
Zayd, various schools of  jurisprudence (al-madha>hib al-Isla>my) are
nothing but the reflection of the evolution of life in the Islamic world,
and these schools changed and evolved, transforming according to
conditions of time and circumstance.13
Shari>‘a, as a human construction, is changeable, and many of  its
rules and regulations are not applicable to present social problems.
Thus, the scholars should re-examine the shari>‘a rules and regulations
to adapt them to present social conditions. It is better to review the
social conditions pertinent to a particular rule, and, if  its application is
no longer suitable, it should be replaced by a new rule inspired by
Islam.14
Earlier Islamic thinkers, like Ibn Taymiyah, recognized the
necessity for change in view of changing circumstances, and it is for
this reason that he came out with a doctrine that religious edicts can
change according to changing times.15  Even an orthodox thinker like
him thought it necessary that ah}ka>m (edicts) should change with the
–––––––––––––––––
13 Farru>q Abu> Zayd, al-Shari>‘ah al-Isla>miyah bayna al-Muh}afiz}i>n wa’l- Mujaddidi>n
(Cairo: n.d.), p. 16.
14 “Shari>‘a, which means ‘the way to the source’ is never confused with the
source itself: the latter declares the absolute and the universal outside of time, but
everything along the way must consider itself in time, in change, in imperfection,
immersed in the reality of humankind—their rich humanity as well as their disturbing
deceits. It really is a way toward the ideal, and anyone traveling along it is invited to make
a constant effort to reform in the light of the universal, without ever claiming that one
has attained the Truth of  the universal. The three sources, the Text as well as the
universe, teach one this humility; see Tariq Ramadan, Western, p. 37.
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change in historical and sociological circumstances. Thus we can say
that “in practice, the ‘Way to faithfulness’, teaches us that Islam rests
on three sources: the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the state of the world, or
of our society (al-wa>qi‘).”16
The above perspective is based on the fact that the Koran was
revealed to the Prophet over a period of  23 years.  Some verses,
therefore, refer to specific events like the campaign at the time of the
battle Badr, and specific acts of the Prophet, such as his marriage to
Zaynab bint Jah}sh. (Q 33: 37). Moreover, various Qur’anic prescriptions
relate to the practices of pre-Islamic society and were in response to
the social circumstances prevalent then, and these practices no longer
have the same social implications. Over the centuries, Muslims societies
have changed and now have new problems which require new Shari>‘a
legislation.
If we carry this argument a little further we can say that while
the Qur’an was undoubtedly revealed for the whole of mankind and
for all times to come, it contained that which had significance for the
Arabs to whom it was revealed in order to be acceptable to them in
their place and time. To be acceptable to the people to whom it is
revealed, scripture must have immediate relevance for them. One might
say scripture is contextually determined by their history, cultures and
traditions. One cannot therefore deduce from verses in the Qur’an in
isolation from their historical context as constitution or as legal code.
It is for this reason that the principle of ijtiha>d17 was used right from
the beginning. Ultimately, the denial of  ijtiha>d means nothing less than
the denial of Allah continuing, living solicitude and the mission of the
Prophet as a mercy to the world.
–––––––––––––––––
15 Cited by Ashgar Ali Engineer, “Islam, Status of  Women and Social Change”,
in Islam and the Modern Age, 1990, 21, 190.
16 Tariq Ramadan, Western, p. 37.
17 In general usage, the Arabic word ijtiha>d denotes the utmost effort, physical or
mental, expended in a particular activity. In its technical legal connotation, it denotes the
thorough exertion of  the jurist’s mental faculty in finding a solution for a case of  law.
See, Wael B. Hallaq, ‘Ijtihad’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of  the
Modern Islamic World, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 178.
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C. Contemporary Implementation of  Islam
1. Rethinking the Shari>‘a Rule on Apostasy
Before I apply this interpretive framework to the question of
the freedom of  conversion discussed above, we must first determine
more precisely what religious liberty is.
According to Muhammad Talbi, “religious liberty, in fact, is
fundamentally the right to decide for oneself, without any kind of
pressure, fear, or anxiety, whether to believe or not to believe, the
right to pretend with full consciousness one’s destiny, the right, of
course, to discard every kind of faith as superstitious inherited from
the dark Ages, but also the right to adopt the faith of  one’s choice, to
worship, and to bear witnesses freely.”18 Thus, “No power of  any kind
in an Islamic state may be employed to compel people to embrace
Islam.”19
Religious liberty is the fundamental right of everyone. From a
Muslim perspective, based on Qur’anic teaching, religious liberty is
fundamentally an ultimate act of  respect for God’s sovereignty and for
the mystery of  God’s plan for humanity. Ultimately, to respect human
freedom is to respect God’s plan. In short, to be a true Muslim is to
submit to this plan.
Indeed, the Qur’an reminds us that not only was Adam created
with rights, but the entire cosmological universe (the heaven and the
earth) was similarly created with h}aqq, an Arabic term that can mean
“right’, “truth”, or “justice”. The idea that all created things posses
rights that are part of their ontological nature is fundamental to the
Islamic conception of justice. The Qur’an strongly guarantees all
fundamental human rights. These rights are so deeply rooted in our
humanness that their denial or violation is tantamount to a negation or
–––––––––––––––––
18 Mohamed Talbi, “Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective”, in Leonard
Swidler (ed.), Religious Liberty and Human Rights in Nations and in Religions (Philadelphia:
Ecumenical Press Temple University and New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), p. 177.
See also, Muhammad Talbi, “Religious Liberty”, in Charles Kurzman, Liberal Islam,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 162.
19 Fath}i> ‘Uthma>n, H{uqu>q al-Insa>n bayn al-Shari>‘ah al-Isla>miyyah wa‘l-Fikr al-Qanu>ni>
al-Gharbi> (Beirut: Da>r al-Shuru>q, 1401/1982), p. 97.
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degradation of that which makes us human.
The first and basic right emphasized by the Qur’an is the right to
be regarded in a way that reflects the sanctity and absolute value of
each human life. Each person has the right not only to life but also to
respect, not by virtue of being a man or a woman, but by virtue of
being a human being. The Qur’an states: “Verily, We have honored
every human being”(17: 70). Following this right is the right of  free
choice, without which divine judgment would be meaningless: “The truth
is from your Lord. So whosoever wishes shall believe, and whosoever
wishes shall disbelieve” (18: 29). The idea of  God’s revelation of  the
truth and the human freedom to receive or refuse is crucial in the
Islamic teaching on revelation and human responsibility. This has been
seen as God’s covenant to human beings since the beginning,20 in order
that it is also the foundation of  responsibility and the consequences
of  reward and punishment in the hereafter.
In addition, for faith to be true and reliable, it must be a voluntary
act, born out of conviction and freedom, unfettered by pressure or
coercion, and left to each individual to decide. So, compulsion and
external interference would be the antithesis of Islamic faith. In fact,
even the Prophet Muhammad was strongly admonished by God not to
compel people to follow the truth of  revelation. “If  it had been thy
Lord’s will, they would all have believed all who are on earth! Wilt
thou then compel mankind against their will to believe?” (10: 99).
This text, revealed in Mecca, was later followed and confirmed, after
the Prophet’s migration to Medina, by the Qur’anic text which declares
that “ there is no compulsion in religion” (2: 256).21 The Prophet
himself let a Christian, who was not sure about Islam, to keep his
earlier belief  and come back to his home safely.22 Thus, the principle
–––––––––––––––––
20 See, the Qur’an, 7:172.
21 This verse was used to reprove some Jews and Christians, newly converted to
Islam in Madinah, who were willing to convert their children also to their new faith. It
also has became the foundation for Christians who were forced to be Muslims to come
back to their religion. And it is this principle of freedom of religion that has helped
reserving and maintaining Eastern Christianity in the society dominated by Muslims.
See, Mahmud Ayoub, “Islamic Context of  Muslim Christian Relations”, ICMR, 1992.
22 See, Ismail Al-Faruqi, Islam and Other Faiths, edited by Attaullah Siddiqui (UK:
The Islamic Foundation, 1998).
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of  the freedom of  conscience is firmly established in the Qur’an23 and
the Sunnah.
As mentioned above, there seems to be a tension between the
Islamic and the Western perspective on the matter of  human rights.
Since Islam is polyinterpretable, our discussion of Islam and religious
liberty has to begin with the stipulation that a dialogical approach
requires a greater appreciation of the statement of Muslims themselves
on matters of  human rights.
It’s worth to mention that for more than a hundred years, Muslims
have argued that Islamic law can and must be revised and reinterpreted
in order to adapt it to present-day needs. Thus, Islam and an adherence
to Islamic law do not, in themselves, pose an obstacle to the
enforcement of  human rights principles.
An-Na’im argues that the provisions regarding slavery and
discrimination on grounds of gender and religion in Shari’ a must be
abolished. While traditionally such practices were the norms, these
aspects of public law of Shari>‘a are today fundamentally inconsistent
with the realities of modern life.24 He states that the aspect of the
Shari>‘a that violates freedom of religion and conscience as a human
right is the notion of  apostasy. Besides its obvious discrimination
against non-Muslims, this principle also violates the freedom of belief
and expression of  Muslims themselves.25 In order to resolve the human
–––––––––––––––––
23 In spite of the relative clearness of the Qur’anic assertion of the freedom of
religion, the subject has become controversial due to certain other passages in the
Qur’an which have sometimes been interpreted in a manner which casts doubt on the
subject. Some commentators, motivated by political discourses have concluded that the
Qur’anic verses which validate jihad and fighting against disbelievers actually abrogate
the Qur’an’s proclamation on tolerance and respect for other religions. See, Muhammad
Hashim Kamali, Freedom of  Expression in Islam (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997);
cf.  Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “The Islamic law of Apostasy and Its Modern
Applicability, A Case from Sudan,” Religion, 1996, pp. 16, 197-224.
24 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, Civil Liberties,
Human Rights and International Law (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), pp. 175-
177.
25 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Qur’an, Shari>‘a and Human Rights:
Foundations, Deficiencies and Prospects”, in Concillium, no. 2, 1990, p. 64 and An-
Nai’m, Toward an Islamic, pp. 183-184.
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rights problem related directly or indirectly to the above noted principle
of  Shari‘a, a drastic Islamic reform is urgently needed.26 He gives an
appropriate methodology of  reform, i.e., an appreciation of  the impact
of historical context on interpretation of sources of Islam. If early
Muslims were able to interpret the Qur’an and other sources according
to their context, contemporary Muslims should be able to undertake a
similar process of interpretation and application of the Qur’an and
other sources in the present time. Throughout its history, the
understanding and implementation of Islam have been influenced by
the social and political realities of  Muslim communities. While An-
Na’im believes that Qur’an is divine, he also believes that there is no
way of  implementing divine texts without the intervention of  human
agency in terms of  both interpretation and application.27
Historical precedents for reform in Shari‘a conceptioning apostasy
already exist. Many thoughtful Muslims in the past were prepared to
reform, even to discard, the pre-modern Islamic jurisprudence of  the
apostasy penalty and accept the concept of religious freedom.28 Thus,
contemporary Muslims who have denied the penalty argue that
traditional pre-modern juristic interpretations were unwarranted by
Islamic sources and out of keeping with the principle that there is “no
compulsion in religion” (the Qur’an 2: 256).29
If we go by the Qur’an, we also can find that there is no verse in
the Qur’an that requires any earthly penalty for apostasy and that the
rule of  apostasy applied by traditionalist  jurists were inferred from
incidents in the Prophet’s life and from historical events after his death
–––––––––––––––––
26 He asserts that shari>‘a is not divine because it is the product of human
interpretation of the divine sources of Islam, that is the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Moreover, this process of construction through human interpretation took place within
a specific historical context which is dramatically different from our own. See, Al-Nai’m,
“Shari>‘a and Basic Human Rights Concerns”, in Charles Kurzman, Liberal Islam, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 237.
27 An-Na’im, “Qur’an, Shari>‘a”, p. 67; see also An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic, pp.
185-186.
28 See for example the commentary of Mahmud Shaltut on verse of the Qur’an
26: 4 in Mahmud Shaltut, Al-Isla>m ‘Aqi>dah wa-Shari>‘ah, 2nd ed., (Cairo: n.d.), p. 33.
29 See Muhammad Talbi, “Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective” in Swidler,
Religious Liberty, pp. 175- 188.
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that actually lend them to the multiplicity of interpretation. A rethinking
of the Islamic tradition in the light of modern concerns and needs
leads to the conclusion that the Qur’anic principle of religious liberty
shares common foundations with the Western concept of  religious
liberty.
Contemporary scholars have found many reasons for rethinking
the jurists’ ruling that an apostate must be executed. They argued that
it is not in line with the spirit of Islam. According to them, time and
circumstances have changed significantly and this should be taken into
account when dealing with the problem. An Egyptian modernist
Muslim scholar, Mah}mu>d Shalt\u>t, Shaykh al-Azhar (d. 1963), argued
that the death penalty in early Islamic history was really a punishment
for crimes against the state. Furthermore, he said that the punishment
for apostasy is really based on isolated h}adi>th (h}adi>th a>h}a>d) and that
h}udu>d cannot be established on such a foundation. For Shaltut, unbelief
alone is not a justification for punishment.30
Mahmoud Ayoub, in “Religious Freedom and the Law of
Apostasy in Islam” said that the Qur’an treats the problem of apostasy
in the context of faith and the rejection of faith. In this context,
“apostasy is a religious and moral decision subject to divine retribution
or pardon on the Day of Judgment. Apostasy is, therefore, a personal
inner moral decision, ultimately lying outside the jurisdiction of the
sacred law.”31 In the past, apostasy was never a problem for the Muslim
communities. To a great extent, it remained a theoretical issue because
the people executed for apostasy until the end of the Abbasid caliphate
in the thirteenth century were few in number. 32
The Lebanese scholar, Subhi Mahmassani, affirms that the
punishment of death does not apply to apostasy per se. And the facts
accompanying to the application of the penalty were intended to be
narrow. He points out that the Prophet never killed anyone purely for
–––––––––––––––––
30 Mahmud Shaltut, Al-Isla>m: ‘Aqi>dah wa-Shari>‘ah (Kuwait: Da>r al-Qala>m, n. d.),
pp. 292-3, quoted by Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of  Religion, Apostasy
and Islam (Ashgate, 2004), p. 95.
31 Mahmoud Ayoub, “Religious Freedom and the Law of  Apostasy in Islam”,
Islamochristiana 20, 1994, p. 78.
32 Ayoub, “Religious Freedom”, p. 90.
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apostasy alone. Indeed, the death penalty was applied when the act of
apostasy from Islam was linked to an act of political betrayal of the
community. This being the case, Mahmassani argues that the death
penalty was not meant to apply to a simple act of renunciation of
faith, but to punish acts such as high treason, joining forces with the
enemy, and sedition.33 Muhammad Talbi34 said that in this field a
traditional theology did not follow the spirit of  the Qur’an; on the
contrary, it seriously abridged the liberty of  choice of  one’s religion.
According to this theology, although conversion to Islam must be, and
is in fact, without coercion, it is practically impossible, once inside
Islam, to get out of it. And according to this understanding, “conversion
from Islam to another religion is considered treason, and thus the
apostate is liable to the penalty of death.”35
The elaboration of traditional theologians relies on the precedent
of  the first caliph of  Islam, Abu> Bakr (632-634. C.E.) who aggressively
fought the tribes that rejected his authority after the Prophet’s death
and refused to collect zaka>t, comparing their rebellion to apostasy.36
–––––––––––––––––
33 S}ubh}i Mah}mas}s}ani>, Arka>n H{uqu>q al-Insa>n (Beirut: Da>r al-‘Ilm li’l-Mala>yi>n,
1979), pp. 123-124.
34 See Leonard Swidler, Religious Liberty, p. 182.
35 See, Abd al-Rah}ma>n al-Ghazari, Al-Fiqh ‘ala>’l-Madha>hib al-Arba’ah (Beirut, 1972),
vol. 5, pp. 422-426.
36 Abu> Bakr’s decision not to negotiate and later to fight against those who
refused to pay zakat was met a strong objections from a number of other Companions,
especially ‘Umar ibn al-Khat\t\a>b (d. 23/644) who felt that the caliph did not have he
authority to fight other Muslims. ‘Umar argued that, because these people were indeed
Muslims, as was indicated by the fact that they declared that there was no God but Allah
and that Muhammad was the messenger of Allah, and performed the prayers, there
were no legal grounds for Abu> Bakr to take up arms against them. This is because for
‘Umar paying zaka>t to the central authority was not as important as it was for Abu> Bakr.
For the latter, however, the matter was not so simple; in addition to being a religious
obligation, the survival of  the central authority of  Medina depended in some respect
on the payment of zaka>t. This was primarily a political and financial issue, rather than
the religious issue which later jurists and historians made it out to be. It was Abu> Bakr’s
political insight as well his strategic thinking that led him to fight for survival. Thus, the
battles that Abu> Bakr fought were not religious; they were largely political, waged to
sustain the central authority of Medina and protect the community and institutions the
Prophet had established. See, Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of  Religion,
Apostasy and Islam (Ashgate, 2004), p. 66.
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They also rely on the authority of  the h}adi>th37 that “Anyone who changes
his religion must be put to death.”38
Interestingly, a close review of  the context in which these
references occur, however, reveals that the only allowable use of force
is for purposes of defense not for coercion. It also refers to a Muslim
who deserts his fellows and joins the enemies of Islam. Thus, it refers
to alienation from the Muslim community, and to rebelling and fighting
against community. The punishment is meant for whom repudiate Islam
and then join the enemy and actively hostile to the Muslim community
or seek to disrupt the social order. It also means, that if  non-Muslims
instigate the use of force for the purpose of military conquest or
religious persecution, or through the breach of  a solemn treaty, then
forceful reaction is justifiable. These passages justify force as a response
to persecution and the threat of  destruction. Underlying this
justification is an appeal to basic moral requirements —either to keep
promises and treaties, or to protect some communities’ basic welfare
and security against aggression. So construed, these injunctions to use
force against unbelievers and apostates are grounded in emergency
conditions, which consist of moral rather than religious provocation.
Thus, it is not fundamentally because unbelievers hold the beliefs they
do, but because of  their manifest moral violations that they are liable
to punishment and coercion. It also can be said that the incidence was
a political issue, rather than the religious one.
The approach above is consonant with Fazlurrahman’s opinion
that the aim of  Islamic ideology, as it expressed in the Qur’an, is to
create a just society, to “command good and forbid evil.”39 This ideology
is presupposed behind each principle of the Qur’an. The h}adi>th
mentioned above, upon which the penalty of death essentially rests, is
always more or less involved with rebellion and highway robbery in
the traditional sources. The incidences during the Prophet’s life or soon
–––––––––––––––––
37 Hadi>th is a term applied to specific reports of  the Prophet Muhammad’s
words and deeds as well as those of many of the early Muslims. See, R. Marston
Speight, ‘Hadith’ in John L. Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopedia, p. 83.
38 For this h}adi>th see, e.g., Al-Bukha>ri>, S{ah}i>h}, (Cairo: ed. Al-Sa’b, n.d.), vol. VIII,
pp. 201-2, and vol. ix, pp. 18-20.
39 Qur’an, 3: 104 and 110; 9: 71.
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after his death during the regime of the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs
on which capital punishment for apostasy in part rests, are the
illustrations of  requital for active hostility or social disruption to the
community; they are persons who, as a result of  their apostasy turned
their weapons against the Muslims, whose community at that time
was still small and vulnerable.40 In these circumstances the penalty of
death seems to be an act of self —defense in a war situation.
Furthermore, the h}adi>th justifying the death penalty is an isolated h}adi>th
(h}adi>th a>h}a>d) and not, technically mutawa>tir41, and consequently it is
not binding. In any case, this h}adi>th is at variance with the teaching of
the Qur’an, where there is absolutely no mention of a required death
penalty against the apostate.
What is needed for a new understanding is to transcend our
apparently limiting sociological and historical necessity. We are often
unaware of the extent to which we are bound by sociological, cultural
and historical circumstances, and the consequent resoluteness and
conviction with which we uphold received interpretation of the Qur’an.
It seems to us that we are bound by a sociological determinism that
makes us intolerant and disrespectful to others, and thus unable to
support religious liberty. Indeed, negative confrontation, such as that
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, relating to the freedom of
religion, could be avoided if we could transcend ourselves from the
experiential limits of  our social and cultural circumstances. Concerning
conversion, for example, if the Saudi Arabian representative could
have transcended his socio-cultural experience, he would have asked
himself why Islam imposes the death penalty on someone who converts
from Islam to another religion, seeing that this penalty is at the level
of fiqh, not at the level of the Qur’an. There is no injunction in the
Qur’an on penalty or punishment. That standard is available in the
Qur’an, but an edict that the convert must be killed is only in the fiqh,
which is polyinterpretable. For this reason one-way to create further
understanding and strengthen interreligious relations is to return to
–––––––––––––––––
40 See, Muhammad Talbi “Religious Liberty”, in Leonard Swidler (ed), Religious
Liberty and Human Rights (Temple University: Ecumenical Press, 1986), p. 183.
41 A h}adi>th is called mutawa>tir when it is transmitted uninterrupted through a
chain of widely believed to the reliable warrantors.
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the Qur’an itself. Only then, can we transcend our socio-cultural, socio-
historical even socio-psychological necessity. This was fully consonant
with the actions of Umar, a second caliphate, when faced with the
death of  the Prophet Muhammad; he had the courage to say, “the
Qur’an is enough for us”. Iqbal as well is opinioned that the Qur’an
has been the ultimate source for Islamic consideration.42
To recapitulate, the Qur’an mentions no penalty for conversion.
Or we can say that there is no specified h|add in this matter. On the
contrary, Muslims are advised to “forgive and over look till God
accomplished this purpose, for God hath power over all things.”43
Today, Muslims are not obliged to impose the death penalty for the
apostate. There is no clear text in the Qur’an to support this penalty.
There are also plentiful grounds for determining that the juristic rules
on apostasy no longer apply. Muslim can identify many alternative
interpretations of the Qur’an consistent with modern ideas of religious
freedom.44
The Muslim jurist, who is taught to consider a scriptural
obligation as prior to a moral duty, must review each obligation
according to whether the divine command that governs it is general or
specific in its application. If the application is specific, he must make
inquiries about any limitations to its application that might arise through
the historical context of its revelation. A divine command must not be
applied universally if the context of its revelation demonstrates
conclusively that its application is specific to a particular time, place,
or social situation. It might also be considered that a moratorium be
placed on a certain rule if  non-suitable conditions exist for its
implementation. It is based on the basic élan of the Qur’an, that is,
moral and followed by social and economic justice.
There are instances which demonstrate that the same shari>‘a rule
was applied variously at different times and in different societies, and
even the Qur’anic stipulations and traditions of the Prophet have often
been suspended. The changeability of Islamic law for example can be
–––––––––––––––––
42 Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore:
Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), p. 168.
43 Qur’an, II: 109
44 In fact, there is no unanimous agreement among the jurist on the issue.
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seen in the punishment for the consumption of alcohol. Although the
Qur’an does not stipulate any punishment for the consumption of
alcohol, during the Prophet’s lifetime a person who committed this
offence was beaten, and although the Rightly-Guided Caliphs were
guided by the Qur’an and their immediate knowledge of the teaching
of the Prophet, they nonetheless exceeded the punishment stipulated
by the tradition of the Prophet. Abu Bakr stipulated whipping the
offender with forty lashes, and Umar b. al-Khattab increased this to
sixty lashes. The later also abolished temporary marriage (Mut’a) that
had been an accepted Islamic marriage contract.
Another example showing how the Qur’an is contextual is the
case of  h}ija>b, in which the Qur’an uses the term in a different way. In
the Qur’an, the word occurs in the Meccan period to mean that the
unbelievers are separated from God (83: 14), and to refer to the fact
that when Maryam found that she was pregnant she lived in seclusion
(19: 15-16). The word h}ija>b was used only once in the Medina period
(33: 7), where it refers only to the wives of the Prophet, to whom men
should speak from behind a curtain. The debate on the subject of
veiling women focuses on Sura 33: 59 and 24: 31 which specially refers
to the wives of the Prophet and to the women of the believers
respectively, each with its context. Sura 33: 59 says: “O Prophet, say
to the wives and daughters and the believing women that they draw
their veils close to them, so it is more likely that they would be known
and not hurt.” The historical circumstance of this verse was directed
against the youth who followed women when they left their compound
at night to go to the outskirts of Medina. Slave women who were
available to men used to be dressed as free women, so the Qur’anic
verse recommends the veiling of the wives of the Prophet so that they
would then be distinguished and not hurt. The command of Sura 24:
31 refers to the fact that women used to wear shirts which had a large
opening below the neck and showed their breasts while their head-
covering fell on their shoulders. Thus they were advised to draw their
head-coverings over their front to cover their breasts. These Qur’anic
verses advise, but do not stipulate any punishment –either in this world
or in the hereafter.
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It is unfortunate that, Muslim reformers who wish to reform
their societies by making Shari>‘a the basis of their legal systems often
forget that the duty of mercy applies to each and every obligation that
is enjoined upon human beings in the Qur’an. What this means in
practice is that when the performance of  an obligation calls for severity
(harshness), it is the duty of  Muslims to temper severity with mercy.
Among Allah’s own names are Rah}ma>n and Rah}i>m (compassionate and
merciful). A Muslim begins everything by reciting Bi’-smi’l-la>hi’r-
rah}ma>ni’r-rah}i>m (i.e. in the name of  Allah Who is Compassionate and
Merciful). Thus a Muslim is supposed to invoke Allah the
Compassionate and Merciful at every step. In fact, Allah sent His
Messenger Muhammad  also as the Mercy of  the World  “And We have
sent you not but as a mercy for all that exist” (21:107). Thus the Prophet
of  Islam represents universal mercy. As the Messenger of  Allah, he is
representative of His Mercy and hence the Prophet himself is known
as rahmah li’l-‘a>lami>n (mercy of  the worlds). Thus a true follower of
the Prophet has to be merciful and compassionate to the extent humanly
possible.
A real Muslim is one who despite being firm in his/her faith
tradition shows equal love and compassion for all human beings
whether they belong to his faith tradition or not. Every faith tradition
is unique and should be recognized as such but it should not become a
tool of discrimination. The Qur’an itself declares that all human beings,
all children of Adam have been honored equally (17:70). Thus there is
no justification in showing any discrimination on the basis of faith as
far as the Qur’an is concerned.
Unlike sufis, who preferred to trust in God’s mercy and
forgiveness, the jurists were more likely to trust in His wrath and
vengeance. The jurists had much to do with their chosen role as guardians
of  religious and social order. They appealed to God who will punish
all those who stray from the straight and narrow. We may better to be
like the Sufis who called upon a God who loves his creatures and
inclines to forgive all sins.
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